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NATURALNESS AND CONVEX CLASS NOMINALISM
BEN BLUMSON
Abstract. In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties
as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees
of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of
dissimilarity as number of natural properties not in common and the
definition of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of natural properties
not in common, since in combination with either of these definitions it
entails that every property is a natural property, which is absurd. I
suggest it follows that we should think of the convex class analysis of
natural properties as a variety of resemblance nominalism.
1.
According to a simple variety of class nominalism, the properties are all
and only the sets of (possible) individuals (for discussion see, for example,
Armstrong (1978b, pp. 28-42) and Lewis (1986, pp. 50-69)). The property
of being white, for example, is simply the set of white things. But according
to simple class nominalism every set of (possible) individuals, no matter
how heterogenous, is a property. So simple class nominalism is incompatible
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with a simple analysis of similarity as sharing properties (Lewis 1983, p. 346;
Lewis 1986, p. 59).1
A standard solution to this problem is to distinguish natural from unnat-
ural properties, and argue that only the former are relevant to resemblance.
As David Lewis, for example, writes “... properties do nothing to capture
facts of resemblance ... It would be otherwise if we had not only the count-
less throng of all properties, but also an elite minority of special properties.
Call these the natural properties ... Natural properties, would be the ones
whose sharing makes for resemblance” (1983, pp. 346-7).
But which properties are the natural properties?
In this paper I consider an analysis proposed by Peter Gardenfors (2000,
p. 71) and embraced by Graham Oddie (2005, pp. 152-8), according to
1Note that some sparse conceptions of properties are equally incompatible with the sim-
ple analysis of similarity as sharing properties. According to David Armstrong’s theory of
properties, for example, there are no disjunctive properties. So if being orange is a prop-
erty and being red is a property, then being red or orange is not a property. Nevertheless,
red or orange things do resemble each other. To avoid denying this, Armstrong argues for
an analysis of similarity according to which “... a particular a resembles a particular b if
and only if: There exists a property, P , such that a has P , and there exists a property, Q,
such that b has Q and either P = Q or P resembles Q” (1978, p. 96). This is supposed to
avoid the problem because the property of being red is supposed to resemble the property
of being orange. Since the analysis of natural properties discussed in this paper accepts
that some disjunctive properties are natural, it might be thought to be able to avoid this
problem, without having to appeal to resemblances between properties. But the results
of this paper show this hope is vain.
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which the natural properties are the convex subsets of a metric space in
which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity. For a simple illustration
consider the set of coloured particulars, with their distance given by their
degree of dissimilarity with respect to hue. Then the natural hue properties,
according to the analysis, are just the convex subsets of the colour circle.2
The convex class analysis of natural properties presupposes that degree
of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. But what justifies this presup-
position? A simple answer would be a definition of degree of dissimilarity as
a function of number of natural properties in common and not in common.
The degree of dissimilarity between two particulars could be defined, for ex-
ample, as their total number of natural properties not in common or, more
plausibly, as their proportion of natural properties not in common (Blumson
2018b, pp. 11-4).3
2Apart from the explication of similarity, naturalness is supposed to have many other
roles in philosophy (see especially Lewis 1983). But the various roles of naturalness are
arguably in tension with each other, and it is doubtful whether a single notion can fulfill
them all (for a detailed discussion of this issue, see Dorr and Hawthorne 2013). For
this reason, I focus exclusively in this paper on the connections between naturalness and
similarity.
3Degree of similarity is defined as number of (sparse or natural) properties in common
by Gonzales Rordiguez-Pereyra (2002, p. 65) and as proportion of (sparse or natural)
properties in common by Alex Oliver (1996, p. 55). These definitions are of course ex-
tremely simple. But simplicity is a virtue, and so if the convex class analysis of natural
properties were compatible with these simple definitions, then that would be a point in
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Gardenfors himself would not accept this simple answer. According to
him, “Seeing properties ... as more primitive than similarity leads to grim
problems. A fundamental task for such an approach is to determine exactly
what counts as a property. ... I know of no theory of properties that fur-
nishes a satisfactory solution to this problem. Consequently, I see no way of
defining similarity as the number of shared properties” (2000, p. 111). But
why isn’t the convex class analysis of natural properties itself a satisfactory
solution to this problem?
There are three reasons. The first reason is that if the number of (possible)
particulars is infinite, then it follows from simple class nominalism that the
number of properties any two distinct particulars have in common is infinite
too. As Gardenfors writes, “... any two objects can be shown to share an
infinite number of properties ... If it is the number of shared properties that
determines the similarity of objects, then any two objects will be arbitrarily
similar. Restricting the problem to natural properties ... does not help –
there are still arbitrarily many” (2000, p. 111).
But whether distinguishing between natural and non-natural properties
can avoid this problem is disputable. As David Armstrong, for example,
writes “We should perhaps take quick and unfavourable notice of the view
sometimes encountered that degrees of resemblance are quite arbitrary be-
cause with respect to any two things at all we can find an indefinite number
its favour. Unfortunately the convex class analysis, as I will argue below, is incompatible
with both definitions.
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of resemblances and an indefinite number of differences and that as a result,
no two things are in themselves more, or less, alike than any other two. To
take this view is really to go back to the view that there are no objective
natural classes” (1989, p. 40).
In any case, I want to put this problem aside in this paper and focus on the
finite case. Simple class nominalism entails that every two particulars have
the same number of properties in common and not in common even in the
finite case (Goodman 1972, pp. 443-4). Moreover, the presupposition that
degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space has its own problems with
infinity (Lewis 1973, p. 51; Williamson 1988, pp. 458-9; Blumson 2018a). I
want to know whether the analyses work at least in the finite case, before
considering problems with infinity.4
The second reason is that simultaneously analysing natural properties
in terms of degree of dissimilarity, as the convex class analysis does, and
degree of dissimilarity in terms of natural properties is obviously circular. As
Gardenfors writes “There is ... a contrary view of the relationship between
concepts and similarity. According to this position, two objects falling under
different concepts are similar because they have many properties in common
.... According to this view, concepts can be used to define similarity. Hence,
we face an apparent circularity” (Gardenfors 2000, p. 111).
4For the infinite case see, for example, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, pp. 173-4), Paseau
(2012, pp. 372-4), Paseau (2015, pp. 107-10), Blumson (2018b, pp. 14-6), Yi (2018, pp. 797,
802-3), and Blumson (n.d.).
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But the fact that accepting both analyses would lead to a circularity
does not show that the analyses are not both true, but merely that they
do not both succeed as reductive analyses. Gardenfors, for example, could
argue that both analyses are true, but that only the convex class analysis is
reductive, by arguing that similarity is prior to naturalness. A philosopher
of a different temperament could also argue that both analyses are true,
but argue that only the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of
properties not in common is reductive, by arguing that naturalness is prior
to similarity.
Likewise, a third philosopher could argue that both analyses are true,
but neither analysis is reductive, by arguing that neither similarity nor nat-
uralness is prior to the other. In this case, we would have reciprocal analy-
ses, which would clarify the relationship between naturalness and similarity,
without reducing either to anything more fundamental. So as long as both
the convex class analysis and the definition of degree of dissimilarity were
both true, the question of whether naturalness is prior to similarity or vice
versa would be left completely open.
I will argue for a third, and more surprising, reason that a proponent of
the convex class analysis of natural properties cannot accept the definition
of degree of dissimilarity in terms of number of properties not in common
– namely, that they are mutually incompatible. The underlying problem is
that they entail, in combination with the convex class analysis of natural
properties, that every subset, no matter how heterogeneous, is a natural
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property. It follows that everything is dissimilar to everything different to
the same degree, which is absurd.5
So proponents of the convex class analysis of natural properties must
reject the analyses of degree of dissimilarity as a function of number of
properties in common and not in common. In this case, we have an analysis
of naturalness in terms of degree of dissimilarity, but no analysis of degree
of dissimilarity in terms of naturalness. If this order of analysis reflects the
underlying order of metaphysical priority, it follows that the convex class
analysis embodies a variety of resemblance nominalism, according to which
similarity is prior to naturalness, rather than naturalness to similarity.
2.
The definition of natural properties as convex subsets presupposes that
degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space, where:
5In a previous paper, I argued that the conceptions of dissimilarity in terms of number
of properties not in common and in terms of distance in a metric space are “logically
independent” but “philosophically inconsonant” (Blumson 2018b). But the claim that
two conceptions are logically independent is not very surprising, and the claim that they
are philosophically inconsonant is extremely nebulous. In contrast, the claim in this
paper that the convex class analysis and the definition of degree of dissimilarity in terms
of number or proportion of properties not in common entail that everything different is
dissimilar to the same degree is exact and surprising.
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Definition 1. A metric space is an ordered pair 〈A, δ〉 of a set A and a
distance function δ : A × A → R from pairs to real numbers such that for
all a, b, c ∈ A:
(1) δ(a, a) = 0 (minimality)
(2) δ(a, b) > 0 if a 6= b (identity of indistants)
(3) δ(a, b) = δ(b, a) (symmetry)
(4) δ(a, b) + δ(b, c) ≥ δ(a, c) (the triangle inequality).
In the current application, the set A is the set of (possible) particulars,
and the distance function δ takes each pair of (possible) particulars to their
degree of dissimilarity, in such a way that (1) no particular is at all dissimilar
to itself, (2) all distinct particulars are dissimilar, (3) a is as dissimilar to
b as b is to a, and (4) the degree of dissimilarity between a and b plus the
degree of dissimilarity between b and c is greater than or equal to the degree
of dissimilarity between a and c.
As a simpler example, we could think of A as the set of coloured particu-
lars, with their distance δ given by their degree of dissimilarity with respect
to hue. The resulting space is the familiar colour circle, with the dissimi-
larity in hue between different particulars being represented by the distance
between them around the circle. A little more realistically, we could think
of the distance δ as degree of dissimilarity in respect of hue, brightness and
saturation, in which case the resulting space is the familiar colour spindle
(Gardenfors 2000, pp. 9-11).
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In this example, the respect of dissimilarity concerned is subjective, since
similarity between red and purple particulars, for example, depends on how
they look to us. But we may also consider spaces in which the respect of
dissimilarity concerned is objective. For example, A could be the visible
lightwaves with the distance between them given by the difference in their
wavelengths. The resulting space is a spectrum instead of a circle, with red
and purple particulars at opposite ends, rather than side-by-side, as they
are in the colour circle.
Because they are drawn mostly from psychology, nearly all Gardenfors’
examples concern subjective respects of similarity. As he writes “In this
book, I focus on cognitive phenomena. The question of whether things
are inherently similar independent of any cognising subject will, in general,
be irrelevant to my concerns. Realism is thus put within brackets” (2000,
p. 110). Although whether similarity is subjective or objective is closer to
my concerns, I too intend to stay neutral on this question here.
Note that interpreted as the thesis that all distinct particulars are dissim-
ilar, condition (2) is closely related to the identity of indiscernibles, which is
extremely controversial (Williamson 1988, p. 463). And interpreted as the
thesis that all distinct particulars of a certain kind are dissimilar in a certain
respect – for example, that all distinct coloured particulars are dissimilar in
respect of hue – it is certainly false. In this case, condition (2) should be
weakened to δ(a, b) ≥ 0 if a 6= b, and the resulting space is known as a
pseudometric.
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However, in the presence of the other conditions of a pseudometric, being
zero distance apart or exactly alike (in a certain respect) is an equivalence
relation, which divides A into equivalence classes of exactly alike particu-
lars, and the function from each pair of equivalence classes to the distance
between their elements defines a genuine metric space, so it is possible to
treat particulars which are exactly similar (in some respect) as if they are
identical (Suppes et al. 1989, p. 47). I return to this point in section (5).
3.
Two further definitions are required to understand the convex class anal-
ysis of natural properties. First, an element b is between elements a and c in
a metric space 〈A, δ〉 if and only if δ(a, b)+δ(b, c) = δ(a, c) – in other words,
if and only if the distance from a to c via b is equal to the distance from
point a directly to point c. Another way to say this – which will be helpful
in sections (7) and (8) below – is that an element b is between elements a
and c in the special case in which condition (4), the triangle inequality, is
an exact equality.
Secondly, a subset B ⊂ A of a metric space 〈A, δ〉 is convex if and only
if for all a, c ∈ B and b ∈ A such that b is between a and c, b ∈ B – in
other words, if and only if every point between points in the subset is in the
subset. The set of red particulars, for example, is a convex subset of the
colour circle, because every particular which is between two red particulars
in respect of hue is itself a red particular.
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The natural properties, according to Gardenfors and Oddie, are the con-
vex subsets of the metric space consisting of the set of (possible) particulars,
with the distances between them given by their degree of dissimilarity (Gar-
denfors 2000, p. 71; Oddie 2005, pp. 152-8). For a simple example, reconsider
the colour circle or, in other words, the set of coloured particulars with dis-
tance given by their degree of dissimilarity in respect of hue. The natural
properties of the colour circle, according to the analysis, are just its convex
subsets.
The analysis counts the familiar hues – red, orange, yellow, green, blue
and purple – as natural properties. Since any particular which is between
two red particulars is itself red, for example, the set of red things is convex,
and so the property of being red is a natural property. But the analysis
also includes other determinable hues – since, any particular between two
cyan particulars is itself cyan – as well as determinate shades – since any
particular between two scarlet particulars, for example, is itself scarlet.
Two clarifications. First, whereas I am interpreting the analysis as requir-
ing that convexity is both necessary and sufficient for naturalness, Garden-
fors writes “It should be emphasised, however, that I only view the criterion
as a necessary and perhaps not sufficient condition on a natural property”
(2000, p. 76). I will ignore Gardenfors’ caveat about this because I think
that one of the main virtues of the convex class analysis is that it does try
to give explicit necessary and sufficient conditions for naturalness – in other
words, that it is an analysis.
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Second, since convex classes are classes, the convex class analysis of natu-
ral properties is a sophisticated version of class nominalism.6 But this does
not preclude the convex class analysis from also being a variety of resem-
blance nominalism, according to which similarity is prior to naturalness, and
so a class is natural in virtue of the resemblance of its members (compare
Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, pp. 56-62). I will argue in section (9) that the con-
vex class analysis is committed to the priority of similarity over naturalness,
and so is also a sophisticated version of resemblance nominalism.
4.
How well the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets captures
the characterisation of natural properties as making for resemblance de-
pends in part on the nature of the underlying metric space.7 But there
are three consequences of the analysis which don’t depend on the nature
6It follows that the convex class analysis inherits some other well-known problems of
class nominalism. For example, in order to distinguish between coextensive properties –
whether natural or not – the classes in question must be classes of possible particulars
(Armstrong 1978b, pp. 35-6; Lewis 1986, p. 51). In addition, possible particulars are
required to prevent a class counting as convex simply because individuals which would be
between its elements happen not to exist.
7Gardenfors and others also argue for the convex class analysis via a vast array of
applications (Gardenfors 2000; Gardenfors 2014; Zenker and Gardenfors 2015). But just
as it is doubtful whether the distinction between natural and non-natural properties can
fulfil its many roles, it is doubtful whether the convex class analysis can deliver on all its
promises (for criticism in this vein see, for example, Gauker 2007 and Hernandez-Conde
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of the underlying metric space, and still support the claim that it captures
the properties which make for resemblance. In particular, the analysis en-
tails that the conjunctions, but not the disjunctions or negations, of natural
properties are also natural properties (Oddie 2005, pp. 152-7).
Firstly, all intersections of convex subsets are also convex.8 So because
the set of individuals instantiating a conjunction of natural properties is
the intersection of the sets which instantiate the conjuncts, the analysis of
natural properties as convex subsets entails that conjunctions of natural
properties are also natural properties (Oddie 2005, p. 157). If being bright
and being red, for example, are both natural properties, then the analysis
entails that being bright red is also a natural property.
This is intuitive, since if two distinct properties make for resemblance,
possession of both properties should make for even more resemblance. As
Armstrong writes “... we noted that it is implausible to say that in the
case of disjunctive and negative “properties”, there is something identical in
virtue of which the corresponding predicates apply. By contrast, if a number
of particulars each have two properties, P and Q, it is perfectly natural to
say that this constitutes a respect in which they are identical” (1978, p. 34).
2016). For this reason, I continue to focus exclusively on the connection between natural
properties and similarity.
8For suppose B and C are convex. And suppose a and c are in B∩C, and b is between
a and c. Then since B is convex, b ∈ B. And since C is convex b ∈ C. It follows that
b ∈ B ∩ C – or in other words that that the intersection of B and C is convex.
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Secondly, some but not all unions of convex subsets are also convex. Being
red and being orange, for example, are convex subsets of the colour circle,
and so is their disjunction being red or orange, since everything on the
circle between something red or orange is itself red or orange. But although
being red and being green, for example, are convex subsets of the colour
circle, being red or green is obviously not, since yellow things are between
red and green things, but yellow things are not red or green (Oddie 2005,
pp. 157-158).
It’s sometimes alleged that no disjunctions of natural properties are nat-
ural properties. Armstrong, for example, writes “Suppose a has a property
P but lacks Q, while b has Q but lacks P . It seems laughable to conclude
from these premises that a and b are identical in some respect. Yet both
have the “property”, P or Q” (1978, p. 20). But it’s too extreme to draw
from this that no disjunctions of natural properties are natural properties,
since some disjunctions of natural properties do make for resemblance.
The property of being red, for example, is the disjunction of all the deter-
minate shades of red. So if no disjunctions of natural properties are natural,
and if the determinate shades of red are natural properties – which they
plausibly are, since being the same determinate shade of colour makes for
resemblance – then being red is not a natural property (Armstrong 1978a,
p. 118). But intuitively, being red is also a property which makes for resem-
blance, and so being red is a natural property.
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So according to the characterisation of natural properties as those which
make for resemblance, some but not all disjunctions of natural properties are
natural properties. It’s an advantage of the analysis of natural properties
as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of
dissimilarity that it predicts which disjunctions of natural properties are
natural properties – namely, those which correspond to convex subsets of
the space – and which are not (Oddie 2005, p. 158).
Secondly, some but not all complements of convex subsets are also convex.
So because the set instantiating the negation of a property is the complement
of the set instantiating that property, the definition of natural properties as
convex subsets allows that some but not all negations of natural properties
are also natural properties (Oddie 2005, p. 157).
For example, the property of being red or orange or yellow corresponds
to a convex subset of the colour circle, since every particular in between two
red, orange or yellow particulars is itself a red, orange or yellow particular
(no purple, blue or green particular is between any two red, orange or yel-
low particulars, since the distance between the two red, orange or yellow
particulars is less than half the circle, whereas the distance via the purple,
blue or green particular is more than half the circle).
But the negation of being red or orange or yellow – being neither red nor
orange nor yellow, or, in other words, being green or blue or purple – also
corresponds to a convex subset of the colour circle, since every particular in
between two purple, blue or green particulars is itself purple, blue or green.
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This consequence is intuitive, since both being red or orange or yellow – or
being orangish – and being green or blue or purple – or being bluish – are
properties that make for resemblance.
But although being orange, for example, is a natural property, its nega-
tion, being not orange, does not correspond to a convex subset, since red
particulars and yellow particulars are both not orange, but orange particu-
lars are between red and yellow particulars (the distance around the colour
circle from a tomato to a banana, for example, is the sum of the distance
from the tomato to a mandarin, and the distance from the mandarin to the
banana). This is intuitive, since red and green particulars, for example, do
not resemble each other in respect of hue, even though they are not orange.
So just as the analysis of properties as convex subsets can predict which
disjunctions of natural properties are properties, it can also predict which
negations of natural properties are properties (Oddie 2005, p. 158). Compare
again Armstrong, who writes “when ¬P applies to a number of particulars,
it is implausible to suggest that the predicate applies because the particulars
are identical in a respect. If particulars are identical in a respect, then they
resemble each other. But it is surely implausible to suggest that not being
P is a point in which a, b, c ... etc. resemble each other” 1978, p. 23.9
9According to Armstrong’s whole theory, every (instantiated) conjunction of natural
properties is a natural property, but no disjunction of natural properties is a natural
property, and no negation of a natural property is a natural property. John Bacon has
proven that it follows from Armstrong’s theory that each individual instantiates exactly
one natural property, and so if degree of resemblance is a function of number of properties
NATURALNESS AND CONVEX CLASS NOMINALISM 17
5.
I argued in the last section that three intuitive consequences of the convex
class analysis are evidence that it captures the spirit of the characterisation
of natural properties as those which make for resemblance. But in this
section I will point out that in three degenerate cases – namely, in the case
of tautologous, inconsistent and haecceitistic properties – the analysis has
consequences which are less intuitive. The last case is most important, since
it’s the source of the inconsistencies proved in sections (7) and (8).
in common, everything resembles everything different to the same degree (see Bacon 1986
and Blumson n.d. for discussion).
At the other end of the extreme, according to abundant conceptions of properties, every
conjunction, disjunction or negation of a property is a property (in other words, the set of
properties is a complete and complemented boolean lattice). In his “theorem of the ugly
duckling”, Satoshi Watanabe proved this conception entails that everything different has
the same number of properties in common with everything else, so if degree of resemblance
is a function of number of properties in common, everything resembles everything different
to the same degree (see Watanabe 1969, pp. 376-9 and Blumson n.d. for discussion).
By allowing that some but not all disjunctions and negations of natural properties are
natural properties, the convex class analysis might be thought to sail just between the
Scylla of the abundant conception on the one hand and the Charybdis of the extremely
sparse conception on the other. Unfortunately, the proofs in sections (7) and (8) show
that the convex class analysis entails an extremely similar result – namely, that if degree
of resemblance is number or proportion of properties not in common, then everything
resembles everything different to the same degree.
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Firstly, the entirety of a metric space is a convex subset of itself, because
if a and c are in the space, and b is between a and c then b is in the space as
well – vacuously, since b is in the space regardless of whether it is between a
and c. So since the set of individuals instantiating the property of existence
or the property of being self-identical is the set of individuals in the entire
space, it follows that the property of existence or the property of being
self-identical is a natural property.
But this is not intuitive, since the property of existence or being self-
identical is not intuitively a property which makes for resemblance between
the things which exist or are identical to themselves – existence or being
self-identical is a property all things have, regardless of how alike or unalike
they are (compare the remarks in Armstrong 1978a, pp. 10-1). On the
other hand it’s not too counterintuitive, since as properties that everything
has, the properties of existence and being self-identical don’t make for more
resemblance amongst some things than others, and thus may be ignored.
Secondly, the empty set is a convex subset, since if a and c are in the
empty set, and b is between a and c, then b is in the empty set too – but
vacuously so, since of course a and c are not in the empty set. Since the set
of individuals which instantiates an inconsistent property is the empty set, it
follows that inconsistent properties are natural. It’s not intuitive that incon-
sistent properties make for resemblance. But it’s not too counterintuitive,
since as properties that nothing has, they don’t make for more resemblance
amongst some things than others, and may also be ignored.
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Finally, all singleton sets are convex. The set {a} is convex, for example,
since every point between points in {a} – namely, just a, which is between a
and a itself – is also in {a}. Since the set of individuals which instantiate a
haecceity – the property of being a specific individual – is the singleton set
of that individual, it seems to follow that haecceities are natural properties.
The set of individuals which instantiates the property of being Socrates, for
example, is just {Socrates} and {Socrates} is convex, so it follows that being
Socrates is a natural property.
However, recall from section (2) that if some particulars are exactly alike,
then in order to satisfy condition (2) of the definition of a metric space, A
should be interpreted as a set of equivalence classes of exactly alike particu-
lars, rather than as a set of particulars simpliciter. In this case, a singleton
set of the space corresponds not to the property of being a particular individ-
ual, but to the property of being one of a class of exactly alike individuals.10
And since all individuals which have this property are exactly alike, this is
a property that makes for resemblance.
I’ve emphasised this point because it’s the fact that singleton sets corre-
spond to natural properties that is responsible for the inconsistencies proved
10Note that this move entails that strictly speaking the convex classes of the metric
space in question are now classes of classes, rather than classes of individuals. However,
we can sidestep this issue by defining the natural properties as the unions of the classes
in those convex classes, so that the natural properties will still be identified with classes
of individuals simpliciter, in accordance with class nominalism as usually stated.
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in sections (7) and (8). If the consequence that singleton sets correspond to
natural properties were too counterintuitive, then a proponent of the convex
class analysis of natural properties might argue that their account should be
altered in order to exclude this case. But since it’s intuitive that properties
corresponding to classes of exactly alike individuals are natural, this move
would be unacceptably ad hoc.
6.
What justifies the presupposition that degree of dissimilarity is distance
in a metric space in the first place? A simple answer would be to define
the degree of dissimilarity between two individuals as their total number of
natural properties not in common or, in other words, the number of natural
properties the first has not in common with the second, plus the number of
natural properties the second has not in common with the first (Blumson
2018b, pp. 11-12). In this section, I explain how this definition meets the
four conditions of definition (1).
Firstly, the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of properties
not in common obviously entails condition (1), minimality, since no partic-
ular has any natural properties not in common with itself. It also satisfies
condition (3), symmetry, since addition is commutative.
However, the definition may not strictly speaking satisfy condition (2),
because there may be distinct perfect duplicates, which share all their nat-
ural properties (Lewis 1983, p. 356). But if two particulars share all their
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natural properties, then their number of natural properties not in common
is zero, and so the definition as number of natural properties not in common
satisfies the weaker condition δ(a, b) ≥ 0 if a 6= b. It follows that having zero
natural properties not in common is an equivalence relation, which divides
(possible) particulars into equivalence classes of perfect duplicates.
Finally and most importantly, the definition satisfies condition (4), the
triangle inequality – in other words, the total number of natural properties
a and b have not in common plus the total number of natural properties b
and c have not in common is at least as great as the total number of natural
properties a and c have not in common. The proof of this is very simple,
but I will dwell on it because it is important in the sections that follow, and
it prepares the way for the more complicated proof in section (8).
Let α be the number of natural properties a has not in common with b
or c, β the number b has not in common with a or c, and γ the number c
has not in common with a or b, as illustrated in figure (1). Likewise, let
 be the number of properties a and b have not in common with c, ζ the
number b and c have not in common with a, and η the number a and c have
not in common with b. Finally, let θ be the number of natural properties in
common between a, b and c.11
11More formally, let A be the set of the natural properties of a, B be the set of
the natural properties of b, and C be the set of the natural properties of c. Then let
α = |A − (B ∪ C)|, β = |B − (A ∪ C)| and γ = |C − (A ∪ B)|. Let  = |(A ∩ B) − C|,
ζ = |(B ∩ C)−A| and η = |(A ∩ C)−B|. And let θ = |A ∩ (B ∩ C)|.
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Figure 1.
Then the triangle inequality for total number of natural properties not in
common can be rewritten as:
(1) (α+ η + β + ζ) + (+ β + γ + η) ≥ (α+ + γ + ζ)
where the terms between the first pair of parentheses sum to the number
of natural properties a and b have not in common, the terms between the
second pair to the number b and c have not in common, and the terms
between the third pair to the number a and c have not in common.
After substracting the right hand side from the left (which we can do since
we are restricting our attention to the finite case) and gathering common
terms together, equation (1) simplifies to:
(2) 2β + 2η ≥ 0
which says that twice the number of properties of b alone plus twice the
number of natural properties a and c have not in common with b is greater
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than or equal to zero. Since both these quantities must be at least zero, this
is obviously true, and the triangle inequality is proven.
7.
In this section I will argue that the definition of degree of dissimilarity
as total number of natural properties not in common and the convex class
analysis are incompatible with each other, because they jointly entail that
every property is a natural property, which is absurd. The problem is that
the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of properties not in com-
mon and the convex class analysis jointly entail that in that space, no two
particulars have any other particular between them, and so every subset is
vacuously convex.
To see this, suppose for reductio that a particular b is between two different
particulars a and c. Then, as I emphasised in section (3), it follows that the
triangle inequality is an exact equality. So it follows that the total number
of natural properties a and b have not in common, plus the total number of
natural properties b and c have not in common is exactly equal to the total
number of natural properties that a and c have not in common.
But recall from equation (2) in section (6) that the total number of natural
properties a and b have not in common plus the total number of natural
properties b and c have not in common exceeds the total number of natural
properties a and c have not in common by exactly twice η – the number of
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natural properties a and c have not in common with b – plus twice β – the
number of natural properties b has not in common with a or c.
So η and β must both be zero. Happily, the convex class analysis entails
that η – the number of natural properties a and c have not in common with
b – is zero, for since b is between a and c, every convex subset containing a
and c must also contain b. But it also follows that β is not zero. Recall from
section (2) that singleton sets – and so {b} in particular – are vacuously
convex. It follows that {b} is a natural property, and so b has at least one
natural property not in common with a or c.
Moreover, although it is not intuitive that b’s haecceity is a natural prop-
erty, recall from the last section that {b} corresponds to a property shared
by all and only members of an equivalence class of exactly alike particu-
lars, or perfect duplicates, which intuitively does make for resemblance. So
it would be ad hoc for proponents of the convex class analysis of natural
properties to disagree at this point.
8.
Another way to justify the presupposition that degree of dissimilarity is
distance in a metric space would be to define degree of dissimilarity as pro-
portion of natural properties not in common. In other words, the degree of
dissimilarity between a and b can be defined as
|A−B|+|B −A|
|A ∪B| , where A
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and B are the properties of a and b respectively. (This formula for the dis-
tance between sets A and B is sometimes known as “Jaccard dissimilarity”
(Levandowsky and Winter 1971), after Jaccard 1912.)
Assuming that every particular has at least one natural property, and so
the denominator of the proportion of properties not in common is always
positive (and continuing to focus on the finite case, so both the numera-
tor and denominator are finite), then this definition satisfies the first three
conditions of the definition of a metric space (1) for the same reason as its
predecessor (Blumson 2018b, pp. 12-4).
Given the labelling scheme described in section (6) and illustrated in
figure (1), the triangle inequality for proportion of natural properties not in
common can be rewritten as:
(3)
α+ η + β + ζ
α+ η + β + ζ + + θ
+
+ β + γ + η
+ β + γ + η + ζ + θ
≥ α+ + γ + ζ
α+ + γ + ζ + η + θ
which, after subtracting the right hand side from the left, putting the frac-
tions in common terms and cancelling the positive denominator (all of which
we can do since we are restricting our attention to the finite case) “simplifies”
to:
(4)
α2β + α2+ α2γ + α2η + αβ2 + 2αβ+ 2αβγ + 2αβθ
+ 4αβη + 2ζαβ + α2 + 2αγ + αθ + 4αη + ζα+ αγ2
+ 2αγθ + 4αγη + 2ζαγ + 3αθη + 3αη2 + 3ζαη + β2
+ β2γ + 2β2θ + 2β2η + ζβ2 + β2 + 2βγ + 3βθ + 5βη
+ 2ζβ+ βγ2 + 2βγθ + 4βγη + 2ζβγ + 2βθ2 + 6βθη
+ 3ζβθ + 4βη2 + 5ζβη + ζ2β + 22η + 3γη + ζγ + 4θη
+ 4η2 + 4ζη + γ2η + ζγ2 + 3γθη + ζγθ + 3γη2 + 4ζγη
+ ζ2γ + 2θ2η + 4θη2 + 4ζθη + 2η3 + 4ζη2 + 2ζ2η ≥ 0 .
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Since all the terms on the left hand side are nonnegative, the left hand side
is at least as great as the right hand side, and so the triangle inequality
is proven (the proof is from Marczewski and Steinhaus 1958, p. 321 and
Levandowsky and Winter 1971; see also Grygorian and Iacob 2018).
If b is between a and c, the triangle inequality must be an exact equality,
and so the left hand side of equation (4) must be equal to zero. But the
first summand on the left hand side is α2β. Since {a} and {b} are both
vacuously convex, it follows that α – the number of natural properties a has
not in common with b or c – and β – the number b has not in common with
a or c – are at least one, so α2β is also at least one.12 So the left hand side
is strictly greater than zero, contradicting that b is between a and c.
In other words, it follows from the convex class analysis and the definition
of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of properties not in common that
the triangle inequality is never an exact equality, and so no particular is
between any other two in the metric space in which distances are degree of
dissimilarity. But if no points in that space are between any other two, then
every subset of that space is vacuously convex. But then every property is
a natural property, which is absurd.
9.
I have argued that the analysis of natural properties as the convex subsets
of the metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is
12The same point could be made using αβ2, α2γ, αβγ, αγ2, β2γ and βγ2.
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incompatible with the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number or
proportion of properties not in common, because they jointly entail that
every subset of that space is convex, and so entail that every property is
a natural property, which is absurd. How should proponents of the convex
class analysis of natural properties respond?
The simplest response would be to look for an alternative definition of
degree of dissimilarity in terms of natural properties. But it seems unlikely
that there is another function of natural properties in common or not in
common which both entails that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric
space, and avoids the incompatibility raised in this paper. So a proponent of
the convex class analysis of natural properties may have to deny that degree
of dissimilarity is definable in terms of natural properties.
Another response would be to concede that convexity is only a necessary
and not a sufficient condition for a property to be natural, thus escaping the
consequence that equivalence classes of particulars which share all their nat-
ural properties themselves correspond to natural properties, and so escaping
the proofs which rely on that consequence.
A cost of this solution is to lose the consequence that conjunctions of nat-
ural properties are themselves natural. For suppose that one of the equiva-
lence classes of particulars which share all their natural properties does not
correspond to a natural property. Then there is a conjunction of natural
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properties which is not itself a natural property – viz., the conjunction of
natural properties shared by the particulars in that class.13
A better response would be to look for an alternative justification of the
presupposition that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. In
particular, one may seek to prove a representation theorem, according to
which if comparative dissimilarity meets certain qualitative conditions, then
it is representable by distance in a metric space, and then to argue that
comparative dissimilarity does in fact meet those conditions.14
In this case, the relation of comparative dissimilarity is adopted as a
primitive. So we have an analysis of natural properties in terms of degree
of dissimilarity, but no analysis of degree of dissimilarity in terms of nat-
ural properties. If this order of analysis reflects the underlying order of
metaphysical priority, then it follows that the convex class analysis of nat-
ural properties embodies a variety of resemblance nominalism, according to
which similarity is prior to naturalness.15
13Yet another response would be to attempt to develop the intuition behind the convex
class analysis, but without the presupposition that degree of dissimilarity is distance in
a metric space. Thomas Mormann, for example, argues for a generalisation according to
which the natural properties are the connected subsets of a topological space, which need
not be characterised in terms of numerical degrees (1993). Because my primary interest
is in numerical degrees of resemblance, I didn’t consider Mormann’s approach here.
14For details of this approach see Suppes et al. 1989, pp. 159-225 and Blumson 2018a.
15I thank Bob Beddor, Uriah Kriegel, Michael Pelczar, Abelard Podgorski, Neil Sin-
hababu, Hsueh Qu, Weng-Hong Tang and Olav Benjamin Vassend for reading drafts of
this paper. I also thank audiences at the Australasian Association of Philosophy, the
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